Market structure and competition in transition: results from a spatial analysis by Labaj, Martin et al.
ePubWU Institutional Repository
Martin Labaj and Karol Morvay and Peter Silanic and Christoph Weiss and
Biliana Yontcheva
Market structure and competition in transition: results from a spatial analysis
Article (Published)
(Refereed)
Original Citation:
Labaj, Martin and Morvay, Karol and Silanic, Peter and Weiss, Christoph and Yontcheva, Biliana
(2017) Market structure and competition in transition: results from a spatial analysis. Applied
Economics. pp. 1-22. ISSN 0003-6846
This version is available at: http://epub.wu.ac.at/5799/
Available in ePubWU: October 2017
ePubWU, the institutional repository of the WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, is
provided by the University Library and the IT-Services. The aim is to enable open access to the
scholarly output of the WU.
This document is the publisher-created published version.
http://epub.wu.ac.at/
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=raec20
Download by: [WU Vienna University Library] Date: 06 October 2017, At: 03:35
Applied Economics
ISSN: 0003-6846 (Print) 1466-4283 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/raec20
Market structure and competition in transition:
results from a spatial analysis
Martin Lábaj, Karol Morvay, Peter Silanič, Christoph Weiss & Biliana
Yontcheva
To cite this article: Martin Lábaj, Karol Morvay, Peter Silanič, Christoph Weiss & Biliana
Yontcheva (2017): Market structure and competition in transition: results from a spatial analysis,
Applied Economics, DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2017.1374535
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2017.1374535
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
View supplementary material 
Published online: 04 Oct 2017.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 41
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Market structure and competition in transition: results from a spatial analysis
Martin Lábaja,b, Karol Morvaya, Peter Silaniča, Christoph Weissb and Biliana Yontcheva b
aUniversity of Economics in Bratislava, Bratislava, Slovakia; bVienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna, Austria
ABSTRACT
The present article provides first microlevel (indirect) empirical evidence on changes in entry barriers,
the determinants of firm profitability as well as the nature of competition for a transition economy. We
estimate size thresholds required to support different numbers of firms for several retail andprofessional
service industries in a large number of geographicmarkets in Slovakia. The 3 time periods in the analysis
(1995, 2001 and 2010) characterize different stages of the transition process. Specific emphasis is given
to spatial spill-over effects between local markets. Estimation results obtained from a spatial ordered
probitmodel suggest that entrybarriers havedeclined considerably (except for restaurants) and that the
intensity of competition has increased on average. We further find that demand spill-overs and/or the
effects associated with a positive correlation in unobservable explanatory variables seem to outweigh
negative spill-over effects caused by competitive forces between neighbouring cities and villages. The
importance of these spatial spill-over effects differs across industries.
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I. Introduction and literature review
Entry of new firms and exit of others is an essential
element of competition in a market economy.
Investigating this issue in transition economies is espe-
cially interesting since 'transition economies make a
particularly good laboratory for understanding the
dynamics of market evolution’(Estrin 2002, p. 101).
By studying the relationship between market structure
(entry, exit and the number of firms in a market) and
measures of market size (such as population) for dif-
ferent regional markets, economists can gain insight
into the determinants of firm profitability, the role of
fixed and sunk costs as well as the nature of competi-
tion. If competition is increasing in the number of
firms, market size has to increase disproportionately
to support additional firms.1 Estimating entry thresh-
olds from the relationship between the number of
firms and an exogenous profit shifter (such as popula-
tion) provides evidence on the toughness of competi-
tion (defined as the rate at which the post-entry
equilibrium markup falls with the addition of compe-
titors) for a product or industry. The attractiveness of
this approach lies in the fact that it can be applied with
modest data requirements. The relative degree of com-
petition can be assessed on the basis of information on
the number of firms, population size, and other market
demographics for a cross-section of local markets.
This entry threshold approach, pioneered by
Bresnahan and Reiss (1990), Bresnahan and Reiss
(1991) and Berry (1992), has been modified and
extended in a number of ways. The effects of product
differentiation are investigated in Mazzeo (2002),
Davis (2006) and Schaumans and Verboven (2015).
Mazzeo (2002) and Davis (2006) use direct measures
of oligopolists’ product characteristics and prices to
determine the effects of product differentiation on
competition and markups in local motel (Mazzeo)
and cinema (Davis) markets. Product differentiation
substantially lessens competition in these industries.
Effects of product differentiation and firm heterogene-
ity are also investigated in Schaumans and Verboven
(2015) for different local service sectors in Belgium.
The authors argue that entry typically leads to a market
expansion effect which implies that traditional entry
thresholds may underestimate the competition effects
resulting from entry. Related work by Berry and
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed here.
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1For example, if the smallest market size necessary to support 1 firm is equal to S (‘monopoly entry threshold’) then the market size (the number of
inhabitants) must be greater than 2S to support 2 firms if competition reduces per-capita profits.
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Waldfogel (2010) focuses on vertical product differen-
tiation and investigates whether larger markets offer
better products. In the case of restaurants, they find
that the number of high-quality products increases
with market size; for newspapers the authors argue
that average product quality increases as markets
grow without an increase in variety. Campbell and
Hopenhayn (2005) consider differences in firm size
(in addition to differences in the number of firms).
They find that establishments are larger in larger cities,
ceteris paribus. Carree and Dejardin (2007) differenti-
ate explicitly between entry and exit of firms. The
importance of imperfect information is investigated
in Grieco (2014), who examines the effects of super-
centres on rural grocery markets. Based upon the work
of Abbring and Campbell (2010), Collard-Wexler
(2014) estimates dynamic ordered probit models
which allow the author to compute entry and exit
thresholds separately. Using data for the ready-mix
concrete market, the author investigates the evolution
of market structure following an exogenous shock (a
merger to monopoly) in a local market. The author’s
finding that it takes between 9 and 10 years for a new
firm to enter the market following the merger suggests
that the dynamics of market evolution can be quite low
in sectors with significant entry barriers; data over a
long time horizon are required to observe changes in
market structure and firm conduct empirically.
The present article extends the entry threshold
approach in 2 dimensions: (a) we provide first empirical
evidence on (changes of) market conduct and competi-
tion in a transition economy and (b) we devote specific
attention to potential spill-over effects between regional
markets and the spatial dimension of competition.
While the existing empirical literature focuses exclu-
sively on market structure and competition in devel-
oped market economies, similar microlevel studies for
transition economies are lacking.2 The structure of a
planned economy as well as the behaviour of firms (or
production units) in this environment differs from the
structure and conduct of firms in a market economy in
many dimensions. During the communist regime, firms
were not independent decision-making units and were
not responsible for sales or pricing. Competitive rivalry
was weak or non-existent and entry of new firms as well
as bankruptcy and exit of existing ones was de facto
impossible (Estrin (2002)). Compared to market econo-
mies, firms were very large and market structure was
highly concentrated. With the collapse of communism,
these countries experienced a fundamental change in
their economic and institutional environment. State-
owned enterprises were broken up and privatized and
a large number of new (mostly small) firms were
founded. This process of entry of new firms and the
re-structuring of existing ones was instrumental in
creating a market structure which is conducive to com-
petition between independent rivals. Given the very
specific structure of a centrally planned economy as
well as the significant economic and institutional
changes during the process of transition, an empirical
analysis for individual industries can provide novel
insights into the evolution of market structure and
firm conduct in a transition economy.
An explicit consideration of the spatial dimension of
competition constitutes the second novel contribution
of the empirical analysis in hand. For many product
markets, consumers face transportation (time) costs
when switching between different suppliers. The entry-
threshold approach assumes that transportation costs
between different regional submarkets are prohibitively
high so that individual markets are fully isolated. The
equilibrium in one market must be independent – in
terms of demand and competition – of other markets.
While this might be a plausible assumption in some
sparsely populated (rural) regions,3 the high population
density in many European countries raises doubts
2Only a small number of empirical studies have dealt with entry and exit in transition economies so far. Roberts and Thompson (2003) estimate entry and
exit rates across 152 3-digit industries in Poland. Similarly, Bojnec and Xavier (2004) investigate the determinants of firm entry and exit for a cross section
of 3-digit industries in the Slovenian manufacturing sector. The present article follows a different approach by focusing on industry dynamics within
individual industries. Avdasheva, Shastitko and Kuznetsov (2007) summarize the broader industrial organization literature on competition in transition
economies with a specific focus on empirical studies for Russia.
3Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), for example, identify towns or small cities in the continental United States that are at least 20 miles from the nearest town of
1000 people or more to estimate their econometric models. Similar procedures for identifying isolated markets are used in Collard-Wexler (2014), who uses
a 20 miles threshold and merges towns which are very close to each other (so-called twins). Zang and Scott (2016) use a comparable approach to identify
isolated markets for medical services, whereby they exclude all metropolitan service areas (MSA) which are within 50 miles of another MSA, all small
counties (with a population of less than 50,000) and all counties which are less than 15 miles from another large county or less than 50 miles from an MSA.
However, using a distance-based exclusion policy is not feasible in more densely populated markets, which has led some authors to focus on size rather
than isolation. To mitigate problems with overlapping markets in European countries, Carree and Dejardin (2007) use data for nonurban areas (all 455
Belgian municipalities whose local population amounts to less than 20,000 inhabitants). Similarly, Schaumans and Verboven (2008) and Schaumans and
Verboven (2015) take into account only local markets with a population density of less than 800 inhabitants per square kilometre and a market size of less
than 15,000 inhabitants.
2 M. LÁBAJ ET AL.
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concerning the assumption of perfectly isolated regional
markets.
Although the ‘isolated markets’ approach has gen-
erated a number of important applications, the extra-
polation of the estimation results obtained from a
sample of rural markets to urban areas is not possible.
Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2015) conclude: ‘Focusing
on rural areas makes the approach impractical for
many interesting retail industries that are predomi-
nantly urban’ (p. 26). The importance of spatial spill-
over effects between regions will not be identical over
time and/or for all occupations: the process of transi-
tion was accompanied by significant investments in
infrastructure as well as an increased mobility of
consumers (due to an increase in income),4 which,
for some industries, should have strengthened the
spill-over effects between individual regions.
In the present analysis, we aim at extending the
concept of ‘entry thresholds’ to a spatial context. We
apply this approach to several professional service
industries in a large number of geographic markets
in Slovakia. The results from the estimation of a
spatial ordered probit model for 3 years (1995,
2001 and 2010) provide evidence of the transforma-
tion of market structure and firm conduct during
different stages of transition from a centrally
planned economy towards a market economy.
The article is organized as follows. Section II briefly
highlights relevant changes in the economic environ-
ment in Slovakia during the transition period. Section
III presents the econometric specification. Section IV
discusses the empirical results and Section V sum-
marizes and proposes possible extensions.
II. Transition in Slovakia and market
description
Macroeconomic changes
Slovakia, a small open economy, started its transition as
a part of the Czechoslovak Federation. Like all countries
in transition, Czechoslovakia experienced a deep transi-
tion recession in the early 1990s, during which output
dropped significantly. The Slovak economy was hit
much harder than its Czech counterpart (output
dropped by more than 20% and unemployment rates
exceeded 10%), as its industrialization during the com-
munist period had made it more dependent on markets
in the Soviet Union and its Central and Eastern
European satellites (Beblavý (2010)). However,
Slovakia quickly recovered from the initial output col-
lapse. Following its peaceful ‘Velvet Divorce’ Slovakia
gained independence fromCzechoslovakia on 1 January
1993. Economic reforms slowed down between 1994
and 1998 but then regained momentum under a
reform-oriented coalition government, which restruc-
tured enterprises and banks and initiated large-scale
privatizations of state-owned enterprises. These eco-
nomic changes paved the way for Slovakia to enter the
European Union in May 2004 and to adopt the euro
currency at the beginning of 2009. The increasing pres-
sure from foreign competitors may have had an addi-
tional impact on structural change and firm
performance; today the Slovak economy is among the
most dynamic of the Central and Eastern European
countries (OECD (2013a)).
The mid-1990s characterize the early phase of tran-
sition. Some first reforms to establish more efficient
markets had already been introduced at that time; the
liberalization of prices and foreign trade started in
1991. 1995 was the third year of the independent
Slovak economy and the second year of growth after
the transition depression. The economic environment
was strongly influenced by a search for a specific
‘Slovak way’ of transition (Marcinčin 2002).
Policymakers refused to continue with the harsh
reforms initiated when Slovakia was still part of the
Czechoslovak Federation (1990–1992). The so-called
Slovak way of transition was characterized by a slow-
down of reform measures, mistrust towards foreign
investors, opaque privatization measures (as exempli-
fied by ‘sale to pre-selected owners’ procedures), exer-
tion of political influence on investment flows and a
revival of state paternalism and interventionism. In
this period, the ownership structure of enterprises
was highly fragmented (an outcome of mass privatiza-
tion) and foreign strategic investors were absent. This
period ended with the parliamentary elections held at
the end of 1998 when a new government was formed.
The early 2000s constituted a period during which
many corrections of the early transformation process
4Note that investment in road infrastructure in 2001 (2010) was 2.79 (5.45) times higher than in 1995 (OECD 2013b). The beginning of the transformation
process was characterized by low capital and labour mobility at intra- and inter-regional levels (Morvay 2005). The number of vehicles in Slovakia increased
from 1.65 million in 1995 to 2.34 million in 2010. Besides, the number of passenger cars increased from 1.09 million in 2003 to 1.67 million in 2010 (MISR
2014). The length of motorways increased by 60% during the 1995–2004 period (from 198 to 316 km) (EC 2006) and reached 384 km in 2008 (EURF 2011).
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were implemented. Macroeconomic stabilization was
achieved and the economy was gradually directed
towards EU integration. The new government
focused on strengthening competitiveness and
initiated the transformation process in sectors that
had been protected during the previous regime
(Morvay (2005)). More specifically, the following
measures were implemented: the banking sector
was restructured, which eased financial flows and
at the same time weakened political influence on
the allocation of credit. Institutions and procedures
of regulatory interventions were changed (regulatory
bodies independent of direct political influence were
established). Generally privatization took place via
international tenders and the economy opened more
significantly to foreign investors, which led to
increased foreign investment inflows.
In the third stage of the transformation process,
the Slovak economy is well integrated into the EU
(after having become a member in 2004) and in
many important dimensions compares well to
Western European economies. After the 2009 eco-
nomic recession, the economy started growing
rapidly again in 2010 (OECD (2012)). Economic
growth in this period was distinctively mono-struc-
tural (dependent on strong expansion in a small
number of branches in the manufacturing industry,
especially in the manufacture of passenger vehicles).
Growth in these sectors was ensured by the reorien-
tation of export, while domestic demand remained
weak. Entry into the EU implied that the economy
had already reached a certain level of commensur-
ability with the economic environment in the more
developed economies of the EU even if income levels
are still lagging behind significantly (Bartosvá and
Želinský (2013)). After the transformation recession,
gross income, measured by GDP per capita,
increased rapidly. While GDP per capita had been
less than 48% of EU-27 in 1995, it reached 52% in
2001 and ran up to more than 72% in 2010 (Beblavý
2010; Sikulova 2014).
Service industries
While the transition process had a significant
influence on practically all sectors of the Slovak
economy, our analysis will focus on providers of
retail services, with a particular emphasis on mar-
kets which are characterized by small firms
focused on selling to local customers. As such,
we are interested in determining how the macro-
economic changes outlined above influenced small
entrepreneurs by changing the administrative bur-
den related to establishing a company and altering
the type of demand faced by each service provider
.While the macroeconomic process of transition
has been well documented (Beblavý (2010)), there
is limited information regarding the microeco-
nomic forces behind this process.
In general, the service sector in the era of centrally
planned economy was undersized. The planning
authorities favoured the production of physical pro-
ducts. This also contributed to the expansion of
entrepreneurial activities after the change in the
system. When the economic transformation was
launched, a significant part of technical services (in
our analysis these will be represented by plumbers
and electricians) were concentrated in urban busi-
nesses providing services in economic hubs or in
side divisions of state production businesses. Trade
and restaurant services were concentrated into state-
owned networks of trade and public catering busi-
nesses (restaurants). Only a very small proportion of
services was formally organized based on a special
permission outside publicly owned businesses (this
was the case with the smallest businesses with only 1
working person and with limited income). In former
Czechoslovakia, the extent of private activities was
small in comparison with other Central European
former socialist economies (Kornai (1998)).
However, this sector featured extensive shadow
activities: in addition to their work in state-owned
businesses, service workers also provided these ser-
vices for people outside the official economy.
Usually, low-quality services provided by state-
owned service businesses with long waiting periods
were complemented by high-quality and fast services
provided unofficially. Moreover, sometimes the goal
was not the gain of cash benefit but rather the
mutual exchange of benefits among people, a process
characteristic for the so-called shortage economy.5
Changes in cultural beliefs also contributed to
changes in the development of service industries.
For instance, there had been a strong tendency
5Kornai (1980) provides a detailed analysis of such practices.
4 M. LÁBAJ ET AL.
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towards self-help performance of dining services or
towards unprofessional provision of services within
family. It was in the case of small-scale services that
the market economy and private entrepreneurship
quickly took off. Service workers could change over
from disintegrating state-owned businesses to self-
employment. The shortage economy brought unsa-
tisfied demand and the workers had experience with
unofficial entrepreneurship; therefore, good condi-
tions for the expansion of official entrepreneurship
in this sector were created. The expansion of these
activities was further supported by the privatization
of former state-owned service businesses, as well as
the relatively accessible opportunity for their perfor-
mance by individual entrepreneurs. An increase in
incomes in the later stages of transformation
together with changes in lifestyle allowed for addi-
tional entry into the sector. The consumption struc-
ture in Slovakia started to resemble the expenditure
structure of more developed Western European
countries, which is characterized by a larger propor-
tion of expenditures on services.
The transition process also influenced the ability
of entrepreneurs to finance their business. In the
1990s, problems in the banking sector (related to
issues connected to political influence and a large
burden of bad loans) coupled with a high interest
rate (supported by a considerable demand of the
state for credits) meant that credits were virtually
unavailable for SMEs. After the implementation of
improvement measures in the banking sector
(Šestáková and Ferenčíková (2015)) and a mitigation
of the state’s crowding-out effect, credits for this sort
of enterprises gradually became significantly more
available. These changes are likely to have influenced
entrepreneurial activity after 1998.
Melikhova, Bažó and Holubcová (2013) point to
service industries as an important driver of economic
growth. In light of this attributed importance, the
empirical analysis at hand aims at investigating changes
in entry behaviour and competitive conduct in several
service industries during the transition period.
III. Data and empirical framework
Data and descriptive evidence
The empirical analysis is conducted for 4 occupations
(automobile dealers, electricians, plumbers and restau-
rants) in around 2900 regional submarkets in Slovakia
for 3 time periods (1995, 2001 and 2010).6 The chosen
occupations are dominated by small and independent
sellers and are similar to those analysed in previous
empirical studies. In selecting these industries we focus
on services which are consumed and produced exclu-
sively locally. Additionally, we focus on industries
which have seen a relatively high level of entry, in
order to be able to quantify the influence of market
structure through a comparison across local markets.
The number of firms in each occupation is obtained
from the ‘Register of Economic Subjects’ of the Slovak
Republic which covers the whole population of firms in
manufacturing and services. Information is collected on
the location and main economic activity (classified
according to the NACE Rev. 1 classification of indus-
tries) of each firm. From this we compute the number of
firms in the different local markets. Note that the num-
ber of firms in a local market does not fully account for
the aggregate supply of services offered in a particular
industry. The number of registered plumbing compa-
nies, for example, will differ from the number of plum-
bers (due to differences in firm sizes) as well as from the
number of individuals offering their services in instal-
ling and maintaining plumbing systems (due to the fact
that not all services are reported as some are offered in
the shadow economy). Despite these measurement
errors, our estimation results will remain unbiased as
long as these differences in firm sizes and the extent of
the shadow economy are not significantly related to our
measure of market size (population).
Following previous research, markets are defined at
the level of ZIP codes which roughly corresponds to the
definition of a city or village in Slovakia. The number of
cities and villages (regional submarkets) identified in this
way is 2843 (2897 and 2926) in 1995 (2001 and 2010).7
Data on population as well as demographic
6Additional information is also provided for 4 industries which are less likely to be influenced by the transition due to their smaller dependence on credit
availability (beauticians, fitness studios, driving schools, and taxi services). The results from this analysis are available in Section IV.
7The main results in this article are based on the full sample of towns from ‘Urban and Municipal Statistics’. The larger cities (such as Bratislava and Kosice)
are divided into a number of submarkets. Unfortunately, the exact location of each individual firm within the market is not available. Our empirical model
thus follows previous research and assumes that the location of a firm within a market does not have any implications on its profits or on the degree of
competition with other firms. The different number of regional submarkets identified for the 3 time periods is due to the disintegration of several
municipalities into separate units over time. The village Žitavany, for instance, was established in 2002 by splitting the town Zlaté Moravce into 2 separate
units. A detailed description of these changes can be found in MISR (2013) and SOSR (2014).
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characteristics of the regionalmarkets are obtained from
the ‘Urban and Municipal Statistics’. The population of
cities and villages is highly skewed, ranging from 12 to
111,800, with an average of 1879 in 2010 (at the end of
our observation period).
We control for several market characteristics such as
wages, unemployment rates, and the share of young and
senior population. Data on wages and unemployment
rates are taken from the ‘Regional Statistics Database’.
Unfortunately, we only observe these variables at the
district level (for 79 districts). The share of population
aged below 15 years and above 60 years for each market
is obtained from the ‘Urban and Municipal Statistics’.
We supplement the data set with information on the
distances between cities and villages in order to capture
the spatial distribution of occupations. Descriptive sta-
tistics for all variables are reported in the supplementary
material.
Table 1 shows the number of regional markets
with a given number of firms. Following previous
research, we pool all markets with more than 7 firms
into 1 category since the number of observations for
larger market sizes is insufficient to accurately iden-
tify entry effects for 8 or more competitors.
Note that the distribution of firm numbers is sub-
stantially different in different periods, as well as
between occupations.While the clearmajority of villages
and cities in 1995 did not have a single automobile dealer
(nor an electrician or plumber), by 2010 there is at least 1
incumbent firm in about 50% of all regional markets.
This situation is different in the restaurant industry,
however. The sector had the broadest market coverage
in 1995 when there were only 39% of markets without a
restaurant. Since then, market coverage has slightly
decreased; in 2001 (2010), 42% (43%) of local markets
had no restaurant.
To illustrate changes in market structure over time,
Table 2 shows the transition probabilities of the num-
ber of firms over the time period (1995–2010). All 4
markets are fairly dynamic. The transition probabil-
ities for automobile dealers show, for instance, that a
duopoly market in 1995 has a 12% probability of
being a monopoly market in 2010, an 11% probability
of having no supplier and a 54% probability of having
more than 2 firms (15 years later).
The large share of local markets with no incumbent
highlights the importance of explicitly accounting for
spatial spill-over effects as inhabitants of these markets
are forced to employ the services of firms from neigh-
bouring administrative units. The existence of these
markets will thus contribute positively to the profit-
ability of firms located in the neighbourhood.
The importance of the spatial dimension in investi-
gating market structure is further emphasized by the
strong clustering of economic activities in space.
Figure 1 shows the results of a Getis-Ord analysis in
the market for electricians in Slovakia in 2010.8 Urban
areas appear to attract firms in neighbouring
Table 1. Number of firms in regional submarkets in 1995, 2001 and 2010.
Number of Automobile dealers Electricians Plumbers Restaurants
firms 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010
Number of local markets
0 1812 1683 1232 2467 2222 1321 2542 2043 1501 1106 1233 1240
1 526 564 621 229 366 578 197 449 577 783 704 668
2 217 241 300 61 132 327 46 163 296 377 375 317
3 83 117 195 25 51 199 19 78 165 188 156 191
4 52 71 133 24 32 107 12 41 104 110 123 118
5 31 49 86 3 15 89 8 23 54 65 47 77
6 18 26 64 4 5 58 0 19 46 43 41 52
 7 104 146 295 30 74 247 19 81 183 171 218 263
Share of local markets with a particular number of firms in %
0 63.74 58.09 43.11 86.77 76.70 46.22 89.41 70.52 52.52 38.90 42.56 43.39
1 18.40 19.47 21.22 8.01 12.63 19.75 6.89 15.50 19.72 27.40 24.30 22.83
2 7.42 8.32 10.55 2.08 4.56 11.50 1.57 5.63 10.41 12.88 12.94 11.15
3 2.92 4.04 6.82 0.88 1.76 6.96 0.67 2.69 5.77 6.61 5.38 6.68
4 1.82 2.45 4.55 0.84 1.10 3.66 0.42 1.42 3.55 3.85 4.25 4.03
5 1.06 1.69 3.02 0.10 0.52 3.13 0.27 0.79 1.90 2.22 1.62 2.71
6 0.63 0.90 2.24 0.14 0.17 2.03 0.00 0.66 1.61 1.51 1.42 1.82
 7 3.64 5.04 10.08 1.05 2.55 8.44 0.67 2.80 6.25 5.98 7.53 8.99
There are 2843 observations for 1995, 2897 for 2001 and 2926 for 2010.
8Similar results are obtained for the other occupations and time periods. The results are reported in the supplementary material.
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administrative units, with small villages in the vicinity of
Bratislava and Kosice, for instance, experiencing above
average numbers of firms. The opposite situation can be
observed in the low-income and structurally disadvan-
taged regions in East Slovakia where cities and villages
are experiencing below average service provision.
The Moran’s I statistics reported in Table 3 show
that there is significant spatial correlation in the
number of firms (as well as in the market character-
istics). This clearly suggests that observations for the
different cities and villages are not independent and
that the spatial dimension needs to be taken into
account explicitly in the econometric model.
Empirical analysis
The empirical framework closely follows Schaumans
and Verboven (2015) and represents a simplified
version of the pioneering work on the effects of
entry and exit by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). In
modelling the market for retail and professional ser-
vices, we assume that firms are identical: per-firm
profits on a market with N firms are
πðNÞ ¼ vðNÞS f , where vðNÞ are variable per-firm
per-consumer profits, S is the market size measured by
the number of consumers and f is the fixed cost of
production.
Since per-capita variable profits and fixed costs
are unobserved, it is not possible to analyse the
effects of the number of competitors (N) on variable
profits vðNÞ directly. However, from observing a
specific number of firms in a market of size S, we
can infer that the N incumbents break even, whereas
the N þ 1th potential entrant does not:
πNþ1 ¼ vðN þ 1ÞS f < 0 < vðNÞS f ¼ πN
Table 2. Transition matrices: 1995–2010.
Number of car dealers in 2010 Number of electricians in 2010
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1995 0 0.59 0.24 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 1995 0 0.51 0.21 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04
1 0.23 0.26 0.16 0.12 0.1 0.05 0.03 0.05 1 0.13 0.18 0.16 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.2
2 0.11 0.12 0.24 0.16 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.14 2 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.1 0.11 0.08 0.15 0.38
3 0.01 0.11 0.1 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.34 3 0.04 0.08 0 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.04 0.6
4 0 0.1 0 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.54 4 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.12 0 0.04 0.58
5 0 0 0 0.03 0.1 0.03 0.16 0.68 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
6 0 0 0 0.11 0.06 0 0.06 0.78 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
7 0 0 0 0.01 0 0.02 0.01 0.96 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Number of plumbers in 2010 Number of restaurants in 2010
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1995 0 0.56 0.21 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 1995 0 0.66 0.21 0.07 0.03 0.01 0 0 0
1 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.16 1 0.43 0.32 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
2 0.04 0.11 0.13 0.24 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.24 2 0.27 0.28 0.19 0.1 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.04
3 0.11 0 0.05 0.21 0.05 0 0.21 0.37 3 0.14 0.21 0.19 0.14 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.09
4 0 0 0 0.08 0 0.25 0 0.67 4 0.11 0.14 0.1 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.05 0.19
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.06 0.25
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.42
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 0.01 0 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.84
Cold spot − 5% Significance
Insignificant G−statistic
Hot spot − 5% Significance
Figure 1. Cluster analysis of the number of electricians in 2010 based on Getis–Ord statistics. The individual circles represent 1
settlement. The size of the circle reflects the population quartile of the village/city.
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or equivalently:
ln
vðN þ 1Þ
f
þ ln S < 0 < ln vðNÞ
f
þ ln S (1)
The log-ratio of variable profits over fixed costs
( ln vðNÞf ) is characterized by a vector of observable
market characteristics (X), firm fixed effects (θN), as
well as an unobservable error term (ε):
ln
vðNÞ
f
¼ Xβþ θN þ ε; ε,Nð0; σ2IÞ (2)
The entry condition in Equation (1) then yields the
following entry rule:
y ¼ N; if θN  y < θNþ1
y ¼ Xβþ ln Sþ ε
The parameters β can be estimated from an ordered
probit model where θN and θNþ1 are the ‘cut-points’
measuring the change in the variable profits to fixed
costs ratio (in log form). Large differences between
consecutive cut-points (θN  θN1) imply that the Nth
entrant has a significant influence on the competitive
conduct of the incumbent firms, leading to lower
markups.
In estimating an ordered probit model for the
number of firms in regional submarkets, the existing
literature assumes zero correlation in the outcomes
of neighbouring units. The high population density
of Central European countries, coupled with the
increasing mobility of consumers and trade between
regional submarkets, however, cast doubts upon the
assumption of perfectly isolated regional markets.
A model which ignores the presence of spatial
correlation in market structure and market charac-
teristics is likely to provide biased estimates for entry
barriers and competitive effects.9
In order to incorporate spatial autocorrelation in
the latent profitability measure (y), we estimate a
spatial autocorrelated ordered probit model as out-
lined in LeSage and Pace (2009). This model implies
that the entry/exit decision of each firm is not only
determined by local market conditions (summarized
in Xβ and ln S) but can also be influenced by favour-
able or unfavourable conditions in neighbouring
markets (represented by ρWy):
y ¼ N if θN < y < θNþ1
y ¼ ρWy þ Xβþ ln Sþ ε;where ε,Nð0; 1Þ (3)
In the above equation, W is a row-standardized
spatial weights matrix with elements (prior to stan-
dardization) equal to wij ¼ 1=dist2ij, where distij is
the distance between regions i and j. 10
The latent profitability measure (y) is assumed to
follow a truncated multivariate normal distribution:
y,TMVNðμ;ΩÞ
μ ¼ ðI  ρWÞ1ðXβþ lnSÞ
Ω ¼ ½ðI  ρWÞ0ðI  ρWÞ1
Table 3. Spatial autocorrelation in firm numbers and market characteristics.
Year 1995 2001 2010
Variable Moran’s I p-Value Moran’s I p-Value Moran’s I p-Value
Firm numbers
Automobile dealers 0.138 0.000 0.197 0.000 0.267 0.000
Electricians 0.065 0.000 0.167 0.000 0.246 0.000
Plumbers 0.112 0.000 0.174 0.000 0.247 0.000
Restaurants 0.155 0.000 0.217 0.000 0.253 0.000
Market characteristics
Population 0.004 0.501 0.055 0.000 0.100 0.000
Wage 0.817 0.000 0.702 0.000 0.759 0.000
Unemployment 0.913 0.000 0.913 0.000 0.908 0.000
% Young 0.290 0.000 0.315 0.000 0.230 0.000
% Senior 0.278 0.000 0.279 0.000 0.259 0.000
9Note that (some of) the existing empirical studies have attempted to address the spatial correlation between neighbouring markets by including additional
explanatory variables (such as the distance to the nearest town, the number of commuters leaving the town on a daily basis and the population located
within 10 miles of the administrative unit). While the inclusion of spatially lagged explanatory variables will capture neighbourhood effects in market
characteristics, the spatial correlation between neighbouring regions in market structure (i.e. the correlation in the endogenous variable, the number of
competitors) is ignored. We discuss different types of spill-over effects in more detail in the next section of the article.
10We set wij ¼ 0 if the distance between regions exceeds 30 km. In choosing a cut-off value of 30 km, we follow Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) who argue that
towns are isolated if there are no competitors within a 20-mile radius. Estimation experiments show that our results are not significantly affected by
changes in the cut-off value.
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In this spatial-lag model, the parameter ρ captures
the effects of competition (via the truncation of the
sampling distribution) and demand spill-overs (via
changes in the mean of the distribution). The para-
meters are estimated using a Bayesian MCMC pro-
cedure from the R package spatial probit described
in more detail in Wilhelm and De Matos (2013). The
method relies on data augmentation. Within the
estimation process, values are generated for the
unobserved profitability (y) based on the observed
number of firms (y) via Gibbs sampling. The
remaining parameters are then calculated condi-
tional on the predicted values of the latent variable.11
The estimation of the model outlined in Equation
(3) allows us to compute entry barriers and to inves-
tigate whether these have changed in the transition
process. In particular, we are interested in the
(changes in the) minimum market size (population)
necessary for the first firm to breakeven (monopoly
entry threshold S1):
S1 ¼ expðθ^1  Xβ^ ρ^WyÞ
where X represents the mean value of X and θ^1, β^
and ρ^ are the parameter estimates from the model. A
significant decline in S1 between 2 time periods is
indicative of a decrease in entry barriers.
To analyse the firms’ competitive behaviour and
investigate changes during the transition, we follow
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and compute entry
thresholds (sN) and entry threshold ratios (ETRN):
sN ¼ expðθ^N 
Xβ^ ρ^WyÞ
N
(4)
ETRN ¼ sN
m
sN1
¼ expðθNm  θNÞ NNm (5)
where Nm represents the upper limit of the number
of firms in a market.12
While the existence of significant spatial spill-over
effects (ρ0) causes the values of the entry thresh-
olds calculated from non-spatial estimation models
to be biased, entry threshold ratios will not be
affected as long as the parameter estimates for the
‘cut-points’ (θN and θNþ1) from the ordered probit
model are unbiased or have an identical bias.
Entry threshold ratios (sNm=sN) are scale-free mea-
sures of the effect of entry on market conduct. If
firms are identical and entry does not change com-
petitive behaviour (mark-ups), then sNm=sN ¼ 1.
Significant deviations of entry threshold ratios from
1 suggest that pricing strategies change as the num-
ber of firms increases. In other words, if a larger
population is necessary for the next entrant to break
even, entry has intensified competition and reduced
markups. Changes in entry thresholds and entry
threshold ratios are indicative of changes in entry
barriers as well as the intensity of competition dur-
ing the transition period.
IV. Results
Tables 4 and 5 report parameter estimates from a
spatial ordered probit model. The results show that
population, which is our proxy for market size S,
positively affects the number of firms in all industries
and periods. The parameter estimate for the log of
population (α) is significantly different from zero
across all occupations and time periods. Wages and
unemployment rates as well as the demographic com-
position of the population in the market have a sig-
nificant impact on most equations. Because these
variables summarize both demand and cost condi-
tions, we do not attempt to draw structural inferences
about the signs of their coefficients. In order to facil-
itate the comparability of our results with previous
research, we ignore spatial effects in the following 2
sections (‘Entry barriers’ and ‘Competitive effects’).
Setting ρ ¼ 0 is equivalent to assuming perfectly iso-
lated local markets. Spatial spill-over effects will be
discussed explicitly in the next subsection.
Entry barriers
Based on the parameter estimates of the spatial
ordered probit model, the entry thresholds (sN)
for the different industries are calculated. The
11The prior for β is normal with mean 0 and variance T ¼ IK1012, where K is the number of regressors. For the thresholds, we impose that θN should lie
between θN1 and θNþ1 in order to ensure ordering but remain agnostic about the actual relationship using a uniform prior θN,UðθN1; θNþ1Þ. For the
spatial correlation parameter we again choose an uninformative prior, using a beta (1,1) distribution to assign equal probability to all values of ρ within the
unit interval. More details on the estimation procedure are provided in the supplementary material as well as in LeSage and Pace (2009, pp. 279–299).
12The ordered probit model restricts the number of categories. We follow previous studies and set Nm ¼ 7. The loss of information is unlikely to be
significant as the incremental change in the perceived competitive environment is likely to be small on a market with 7 versus 8 firms and cities and
villages with more than 10 competitors are likely to consist of sub-markets.
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Table 4. Parameter estimates obtained from a spatial ordered probit model for Slovakia in 1995, 2001 and 2010 for automobile
dealers and electricians.
Automobile dealers Electricians
1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010
Population (log) (α) 0.9323*** 0.9502*** 1.0506*** 0.7722*** 0.8526*** 0.9989***
(0.0335) (0.0359) (0.0486) (0.0434) (0.0357) (0.0473)
Wages −0.0085*** 0.0002 0.0001 0.0008 −0.0041*** −0.001***
(0.0022) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0029) (0.0008) (0.0003)
Unemployment (%) −0.3717 −0.9311* −2.1094*** −1.2989 −4.0265*** −1.6208***
(0.6221) (0.3931) (0.4591) (0.8714) (0.4972) (0.4375)
Young (%) −6.428*** −6.8196*** −5.7315*** −3.6165*** −4.5872*** −4.1251***
(0.9291) (0.8017) (0.6822) (1.3306) (0.9601) (65.5416)
Elderly (%) −4.0319*** −2.9060*** −1.724*** −2.4394** −2.6615** −0.3243
(0.7435) (0.6914) (0.6472) (1.1268) (0.8753) (0.6289)
θ1 2.1573*** 4.2908*** 4.931*** 4.7595*** 2.4989*** 4.6199***
(0.6859) (0.5007) (0.3979) (0.9696) (0.5824) (0.4032)
θ2 3.0339*** 5.1524*** 5.8089*** 5.584*** 3.3437*** 5.4291***
(0.6859) (0.5037) (0.4241) (0.9715) (0.5850) (0.4285)
θ3 3.6428*** 5.6954*** 6.3211*** 6.0594*** 3.9189*** 5.9864***
(0.6884) (0.5096) (0.4487) (0.9750) (0.5888) (0.4498)
θ4 4.0072*** 6.0795*** 6.7329*** 6.3642*** 4.2748*** 6.4341***
(0.6912) (0.5137) (0.4710) (0.9775) (0.5903) (0.4725)
θ5 4.3249*** 6.4035*** 7.0842*** 6.8108*** 4.5880*** 6.7399***
(0.6941) (0.5195) (0.4906) (0.9861) (0.5942) (0.493)
θ6 4.5849*** 6.7026*** 7.3644*** 6.9095*** 4.7915*** 7.0524***
(0.6961) (0.5246) (0.5053) (0.9879) (0.5991) (0.5114)
θ7 4.7803*** 6.9126*** 7.6173*** 7.0423*** 4.8796*** 7.3061***
(0.6986) (0.5262) (0.5112) (0.9895) (0.6001) (0.5176)
ρ 0.2954*** 0.1885*** 0.202*** 0.2687*** 0.2114*** 0.2967***
(0.0361) (0.0360) (0.0325) (0.0655) (0.0448) (0.0315)
Observations 2843 2897 2926 2843 2897 2926
All markets with more than 7 firms are pooled in 1 category. SEs are in parenthesis.
***, ** and * indicate that parameters are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 5. Parameter estimates obtained from a spatial ordered probit model for Slovakia in 1995, 2001 and 2010 for plumbers and
restaurants.
Plumbers Restaurants
1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010
Population (log) (α) 0.4858*** 0.7579*** 0.8689*** 1.1259*** 1.0620*** 1.008***
(0.0373) (0.0319) (0.0394) (0.0351) (0.0378) (0.0473)
Wages 0.0008 −0.0038*** −0.001*** −0.0056*** −0.0012* −0.0008***
(0.0027) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.002) (0.0007) (0.0003)
Unemployment (%) −1.5532* −2.8220*** −2.2081*** −1.0819* −1.9596*** −1.2649***
(0.8104) (0.4398) (0.453) (0.5779) (0.3859) (0.4241)
Young (%) −0.0027 −2.9532*** −4.1713*** −5.5108*** −6.2594*** −3.8981***
(1.2387) (0.8414) (0.6838) (0.7803) (0.7176) (0.647)
Elderly (%) −1.4517 −2.5060** −2.0243*** −1.8826*** −2.2358*** 0.5796
(1.0866) (0.7843) (0.6655) (0.5927) (0.5896) (0.5948)
θ1 3.4594*** 2.2597*** 3.5195*** 3.8612*** 3.9906*** 5.0548***
(0.904) (0.5529) (0.3925) (0.6150) (0.4610) (0.4040)
θ2 4.2427*** 3.0994*** 4.3417*** 4.9053*** 4.9617*** 5.9422***
(0.9069) (0.5552) (0.4062) (0.6169) (0.4641) (0.4289)
θ3 4.6454*** 3.6267*** 4.9092*** 5.5774*** 5.6678*** 6.4954***
(0.9087) (0.5579) (0.4240) (0.6218) (0.4709) (0.4524)
θ4 4.926*** 4.0256*** 5.3342*** 6.0696*** 6.0797*** 6.9349***
(0.9119) (0.5605) (0.4391) (0.6259) (0.4786) (0.4795)
θ5 5.1875*** 4.3255*** 5.6878*** 6.4669*** 6.5137*** 7.2793***
(0.9182) (0.5621) (0.4538) (0.6294) (0.4882) (0.5040)
θ6 5.445*** 4.5445*** 5.9174*** 6.7827*** 6.7280*** 7.5532***
(0.9231) (0.5638) (0.4638) (0.6308) (0.4934) (0.5191)
θ7 4.7621*** 6.1581*** 7.0602*** 6.9497*** 7.7802***
(0.5656) (0.4684) (0.6329) (0.4951) (0.5246)
ρ 0.5725*** 0.3866*** 0.3364*** 0.0877*** 0.1135*** 0.2742***
(0.0359) (0.0363) (0.0323) (0.033) (0.0321) (0.0320)
Observations 2843 2897 2926 2843 2897 2926
All markets with more than 5 firms are pooled in 1 category. SEs are in parenthesis.
***,** and * indicate that parameters are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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results are summarized in Table 6.13 The estimated
monopoly entry threshold population suggests that
entry barriers for 3 retail industries (automobile
dealers, electricians and plumbers) were lowered
significantly in the 15 years of transition.
The range of the drop in population necessary
for one firm to break even varies across indus-
tries. From 1995 to 2001 (from 2001 to 2010) the
population necessary for the first firm to break
even decreased by 12% (38%) for automobile
dealers. The estimated entry threshold is signifi-
cantly lower than that for electricians and plum-
bers. However, it should be noted that
automobile dealers is an aggregate category
including both the sale of vehicle parts and the
sale of vehicles, as well as sellers offering repairs.
Since many sellers are likely to engage in both
activities, we focus on the sum of sellers. As there
is some differentiation between the firms selling
only complete vehicles, those selling parts and
those offering both, it is likely that this threshold
is underestimated. We account for this in Tables
7–9, which calculates the entry threshold popula-
tion for each separate category. If one focuses
only on sellers offering complete vehicles, the
entry threshold for the first firm goes up to
3730 (3650) in 1995 (2001) before falling to
2051 in 2010. These magnitudes are slightly
higher than those calculated for electricians and
plumbers and likely reflect the fact that automo-
bile purchases occur more rarely. The observed
fall in entry threshold population is likely to be
correlated with the increased access to credit for
consumers, which allows them to smooth con-
sumption and make purchases of vehicles more
regularly.
From 1995 to 2001 (from 2001 to 2010) the popula-
tion necessary for the first firm to break even decreased
by 58% (45%) for plumbers and 38% (68%) for electri-
cians. It is important to note that this change was driven
not only by institutional and structural reforms but was
also related to changes in the macroeconomic environ-
ment (such as the increase in real income) in Slovakia. In
particular, we conjecture that 3 processes are behind the
fall in entry threshold ratios in these 2 industries. Firstly,
we expect that the banking reform and access to credit
allowed for increased investment in properties and a
resulting boost in the demand for maintenance services.
Secondly, one might expect that with the privatization
and atomization of large manufacturing firms, many
services which would have been offered by an ‘in-
house’ technician became outsourced to small providers
Table 6. Per-firm entry thresholds for Slovakia in 1995, 2001 and 2010.
Automobile dealers Electricians Plumbers Restaurants
1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010
Total threshold population
S1 924 815 502 2808 1753 558 2894 1225 670 434 477 508
S2 2366 2018 1157 8170 4721 1254 14,517 3709 1727 1098 1191 1225
S3 4547 3573 1884 15,121 9268 2191 33,258 7437 3318 1995 2315 2120
S4 6722 5353 2788 22,439 14,069 3429 59,266 12,590 5411 3088 3412 3279
S5 9451 7528 3895 40,009 20,316 4658 101,530 18,701 8128 4395 5134 4614
S6 12,491 10,313 5085 45,469 25,793 6369 172,485 24,965 10,586 5818 6282 6055
S7 15,403 12,863 6469 53,999 28,598 8210 33,269 13,966 7444 7741 7585
Threshold population per firm
s1 924 815 502 2808 1753 558 2894 1225 670 434 477 508
(29) (26) (22) (338) (105) (21) (535) (59) (24) (12) (15) (18)
s2 1183 1009 579 4085 2360 627 7259 1855 863 549 595 612
(31) (24) (10) (337) (104) (11) (1053) (75) (19) (9) (11) (12)
s3 1516 1191 628 5040 3089 730 11,086 2479 1106 665 772 707
(36) (24) (11) (325) (114) (12) (1,291) (86) (23) (10) (12) (11)
s4 1680 1338 697 5610 3517 857 14,816 3148 1353 772 853 820
(35) (26) (12) (301) (109) (15) (1,442) (100) (27) (10) (13) (14)
s5 1890 1506 779 8002 4063 932 20,306 3740 1626 879 1027 923
(36) (27) (13) (401) (115) (16) (1730) (107) (32) (11) (16) (16)
s6 2082 1719 848 7578 4299 1061 28,747 4161 1764 970 1047 1009
(36) (29) (14) (327) (108) (18) (2260) (106) (32) (11) (15) (17)
s7 2200 1838 924 7714 4085 1173 4753 1995 1063 1106 1084
(34) (28) (13) (296) (90) (17) (112) (32) (11) (14) (16)
SEs are in parenthesis.
13As economic theory constrains the parameter of ln S to 1, we normalize the other parameters when calculating entry thresholds (i.e. SN ¼ exp θXβα ).
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of electrical and plumbing services. As such, sellers
which may have been active on the market previously
now represent independent economic agents, pushing
the thresholds across all market structures down.
Thirdly, there may be a propensity in these industries
for informal service provision. One would expect that as
Table 8. Per-firm entry thresholds for Slovakia in 1995, 2001
and 2010.
Sale of vehicles Sale of vehicle parts
1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010
Total threshold population
S1 3730 3650 2051 7482 5392 3375
S2 9081 10,271 5760 19,145 14,653 8229
S3 16,015 18,841 9114 35,283 23,157 13,212
S4 20,514 26,035 13,851 49,252 30,508 20,683
S5 31,947 34,749 18,391 66,585 41,456 27,499
S6 41,300 41,733 20,624 87,487 59,517 35,357
S7 46,005 52,288 23,412 121,554 71,123 40,054
Threshold population per firm
s1 3730 3650 2051 7482 5392 3375
(554) (423) (152) (1,716) (964) (377)
s2 4541 5136 2880 9572 7326 4115
(424) (406) (151) (1,387) (848) (292)
s3 5338 6280 3038 11,761 7719 4404
(383) (389) (122) (1,300) (658) (234)
s4 5129 6509 3463 12,313 7627 5171
(295) (327) (116) (1,083) (519) (227)
s5 6389 6950 3678 13317 8291 5500
(324) (297) (107) (992) (479) (205)
s6 6883 6955 3437 14,581 9919 5893
(308) (259) (86) (958) (511) (193)
s7 6572 7470 3345 17,365 10,160 5722
(255) (249) (73) (1026) (464) (164)
SEs are in parenthesis.
Table 9. Entry threshold ratios for Slovakia in 1995, 2001 and 2010.
Sale of vehicles Sale of vehicle parts
1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010
Per-firm entry threshold ratios (s7=sN)
s7=s1 1.76 2.05 1.63 2.32 1.88 1.70
(0.27) (0.25) (0.13) (0.55) (0.35) (0.20)
s7=s2 1.45 1.45 1.16 1.81 1.39 1.39
(0.15) (0.12) (0.07) (0.28) (0.17) (0.11)
s7=s3 1.23 1.19 1.10 1.48 1.32 1.30
(0.10) (0.08) (0.05) (0.19) (0.13) (0.08)
s7=s4 1.28 1.15 0.97 1.41 1.33 1.11
(0.09) (0.07) (0.04) (0.15) (0.11) (0.06)
s7=s5 1.03 1.07 0.91 1.30 1.23 1.04
(0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (0.12) (0.09) (0.05)
s7=s6 0.95 1.07 0.97 1.19 1.02 0.97
(0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.11) (0.07) (0.04)
Test ratio = 1
s7=s1=1 *** *** *** ** ** ***
Chi-sq. 7.93 17.99 24.98 5.77 6.47 12.66
s7=s2=1 *** *** ** *** ** ***
Chi-sq. 9.33 13.27 5.98 8.22 5.03 13.44
s7=s3=1 ** ** * ** ** ***
Chi-sq. 5.29 5.12 4.01 6.63 6.18 14.53
s7=s4=1 *** ** ** *** *
Chi-sq. 10 4.55 0.78 7.54 9.25 3.38
s7=s5=1 ** ** **
Chi-sq. 0.19 1.65 7.50 6.01 6.24 0.68
s7=s6=1 *
Chi-sq. 0.64 1.90 0.70 3.29 0.12 0.47
SEs are in parenthesis.
***,** and * indicate that the ETRs are significantly different from one at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 7. Parameter estimates obtained from a spatial ordered probit model for Slovakia in 1995, 2001 and 2010 for sellers of
vehicles and sellers of vehicles parts.
Sale of vehicles Sale of vehicle parts
1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010
Population (log) (α) 0.9704*** 0.8550*** 0.8763*** 0.8950*** 0.9653*** 0.9168***
(0.0580) (0.0459) (0.0372) (0.0697) (0.0640) (0.0449)
Wages −0.0100*** 0.0004 0.0007* 0.0011 −0.0014 0.0008*
(0.0036) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0043) (0.0011) (0.0004)
Unemployment (%) 0.0025 0.0033*** 0.9380* 0.0335*** 0.0030*** 1.2651*
(0.0104) (0.0009) (0.5646) (0.0128) (0.0010) (0.6620)
Young (%) −7.5647*** −7.8085*** −5.2157*** −7.9302*** −5.9912*** −6.1762***
(1.6494) (1.2965) (1.1622) (1.9459) (1.6150) (1.4109)
Elderly (%) −3.1218** −3.5120*** 0.5918 −5.5244*** −0.3065 −0.0347
(1.4047) (1.1733) (1.0416) (1.6992) (1.3827) (1.2174)
θ1 3.5373*** 4.8927*** 6.6248*** 5.7554*** 6.5742*** 7.1719***
(1.1856) (0.7558) (0.5952) (1.4702) (0.9326) (0.6860)
θ2 4.4008*** 5.7773*** 7.5298*** 6.5963*** 7.5393*** 7.9892***
(1.1870) (0.7606) (0.6037) (1.4767) (0.9390) (0.6933)
θ3 4.9513*** 6.2960*** 7.9318*** 7.1435*** 7.9811*** 8.4232***
(1.1898) (0.7673) (0.6081) (1.4848) (0.9440) (0.6996)
θ4 5.1916*** 6.5726*** 8.2986*** 7.4420*** 8.2472*** 8.8340***
(1.1920) (0.7705) (0.6163) (1.4892) (0.9494) (0.7087)
θ5 5.6214*** 6.8194*** 8.5471*** 7.7119*** 8.5432*** 9.0952***
(1.1951) (0.7764) (0.6199) (1.4955) (0.9539) (0.7176)
θ6 5.8706*** 6.9760*** 8.6475*** 7.9563*** 8.8923*** 9.3256***
(1.1976) (0.7803) (0.6219) (1.5007) (0.9614) (0.7231)
θ7 5.9753*** 7.1688*** 8.7586*** 8.2506*** 9.0643*** 9.4400***
(1.1983) (0.7844) (0.6252) (1.5053) (0.9661) (0.7266)
ρ 0.0685 0.0469 0.3100*** 0.0082 −0.0373 0.1257*
(0.0903) (0.0688) (0.0530) (0.0982) (0.0984) (0.0715)
Observations 2843 2897 2926 2843 2897 2926
All markets with more than 7 firms are pooled in 1 category. SEs are in parenthesis.
***,** and * indicate that parameters are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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the administrative barriers for the registration of firms
go down, more sellers choose to register legally. If a
move away from the shadow economy has occurred
during our observation period, we may overestimate
the change in the actual difficulty of entry.
The transition towards a market economy fol-
lowed a different path in the case of restaurants. In
this industry entry thresholds did not change signif-
icantly during our observation period. The slight
decrease in market coverage and the increase in the
geographic concentration of restaurants in towns
can be explained by decreasing employment in
rural areas and high employment and income
growth in towns. Besides, a lot of universal and
traditional village restaurants were closed in the
country-side, while restaurants with more differen-
tiated products were established in larger towns.
Furthermore, the share of household expenditures
on restaurants decreased from 7% in 2001 to 5% in
2010, which may have mitigated the effect of grow-
ing income over this period and may have contrib-
uted to the relatively constant break-even
population. On the other hand, the share of expen-
ditures on maintenance and repair of dwellings
(important for plumbers and electricians) increased
from 1.9% to 3% in 2010. Additionally, the increase
in real income in Slovakia could have had a stronger
impact on electricians and plumbers compared to
restaurants because they also supply repair services
to other firms and entrepreneurs and not only to
individuals (households). While the real income
measured by GDP per capita increased rapidly
between 2001 and 2010, it was driven mainly by
the growth in gross profits and to a much lower
extent by the growth of real wages. This would
suggest that the growth in demand was higher for
electricians and plumbers than for restaurants.
Competitive effects
Changes in competitive pressure due to entry are
measured by the ordered probit parameters θN .
Based on these values we calculate entry threshold
ratios (s7=sN) for all occupations. Table 10 reports
these values for the 4 industries in our sample; the
evolution over time is illustrated in Figure 2.
The results indicate that there are substantial dif-
ferences in the mark-ups of firms which hold a
monopoly position and those faced with competi-
tion. Our estimates show that the entry threshold on
a market with 7 competitors is significantly higher
than the entry threshold for a monopolist. The
Table 10. Entry threshold ratios for Slovakia in 1995, 2001 and 2010.
Automobile dealers Electricians Plumbers Restaurants
1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010
Per-firm entry threshold ratios (s7=sN)
s7=s1 2.38 2.26 1.84 2.75 2.33 2.10 9.93 3.88 2.98 2.45 2.32 2.13
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.35) (0.15) (0.09) (1.99) (0.21) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
s7=s2 1.86 1.82 1.60 1.89 1.73 1.87 3.96 2.56 2.31 1.94 1.86 1.77
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.17) (0.09) (0.04) (0.65) (0.12) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
s7=s3 1.45 1.54 1.47 1.53 1.32 1.61 2.59 1.92 1.80 1.60 1.43 1.53
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.11) (0.06) (0.04) (0.36) (0.08) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
s7=s4 1.31 1.37 1.33 1.38 1.16 1.37 1.94 1.51 1.47 1.38 1.30 1.32
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03) (0.24) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
s7=s5 1.16 1.22 1.19 0.96 1.01 1.26 1.42 1.27 1.23 1.21 1.08 1.17
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.16) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
s7=s6 1.06 1.07 1.09 1.02 0.95 1.10 1.14 1.13 1.10 1.06 1.07
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Test ratio = 1
s7=s1 ¼ 1 *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Chi-sq. 276.08 244.55 101.90 25.37 79.86 168.32 20.06 193.62 276.33 377.04 297.59 194.03
s7=s2 ¼ 1 *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Chi-sq. 235.04 252.88 267.59 26.70 73.32 400.40 20.52 170.93 422.72 579.55 451.33 331.80
s7=s3 ¼ 1 *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Chi-sq. 122.20 193.20 206.07 21.29 32.12 281.34 19.11 129.74 282.11 422.62 220.21 258.10
s7=s4 ¼ 1 *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Chi-sq. 83.19 123.68 118.67 17.12 13.30 141.39 15.00 73.15 154.97 258.47 138.36 119.16
s7=s5 ¼ 1 *** *** *** *** ** *** *** *** *** ***
Chi-sq. 32.91 58.04 49.71 0.35 0.02 82.39 6.42 32.97 53.49 107.28 12.91 41.46
s7=s6 ¼ 1 ** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Chi-sq. 5.38 8.07 14.64 0.09 2.43 17.73 12.91 22.78 30.77 7.94 9.49
As s7 could not be estimated for plumbers in 1995, the ETRs are calculated based on s6.
***,** and * indicate that the ETRs are significantly different from one at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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estimated threshold ratio (s7=s1) ranges between 1.84
and 3.88 and significantly differs from 1 for all
periods and professions.
For most occupations and time periods, the
largest effect on competition occurred with the
entry of the second and third firms. While the
entry threshold ratios remain significantly differ-
ent from 1 for the next 3 entrants, their absolute
value is much closer to unity, indicating that
markups were close to the competitive bench-
mark. These results are consistent with findings
from previous empirical studies (Bresnahan and
Reiss 1991; Schaumans and Verboven 2015).
The most substantial changes can be observed
in the automobile dealer and plumber market. As
can be seen from the results in Table 9, the
changes in competitive conduct were mainly due
to intense competition in the sale of vehicle parts,
whereas competition in the sale of the vehicles
themselves intensified only marginally over our
observation period. It appears that market con-
testability improved in the part of the sector
which requires the least initial investment (the
sale of parts). In general, the accession to the
European Union (from 2001 to 2010) seems to
have had the strongest impact on competition in
the sale of vehicles. This may be due to the
availability of a wider range of suppliers once
barriers to trade were completely eradicated.
The early phase of transition (from 1995 to 2001)
led to a significant intensification of competition for
plumbers. However, it should be noted that the
reported estimate is likely to slightly overstate the
true magnitude of the effect. Of the industries we
focus on, plumbing and electrical services are most
likely to take place in the shadow economy. This is
likely to depress the recorded number of firms, espe-
cially in rural areas, where firms can benefit from a
reputation without having to face the costs related to
registration and taxation of their services. Since rural
areas are likely to have fewer sellers, this would mean
that the bias is strongest for the monopoly threshold.
As such, we may overestimate the number of people
which are necessary for a monopolist to break-even,
since the reported results reflect the threshold popula-
tion for legal registration, which may be higher than
the threshold for the establishment of a firm. As out-
lined in the previous section, if the incentives to parti-
cipate in the informal economy decreased during the
transition process, this may in part explain the magni-
tude of change estimated for plumbing services.
No clear trend can be observed in the market for
electric services; large SEs do not allow us to make
conclusive statements regarding the change in compe-
titive conduct in this market. Nevertheless, the overall
trend towards decreasing monopoly mark-ups is pre-
sent in the absolute value of the calculated entry
threshold ratios.
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Figure 2. Break-even population and ETRs in transition.
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Only minor changes are observed in the restau-
rant industry where ETRs decreased significantly
between 1995 and 2001 but remained relatively
constant in the subsequent period; we observe
the smallest decrease in ETRs in absolute terms
in this market. In the case of restaurants, it is also
important to note that entry in this market does
not necessarily lead to more competition for
potential customers. As argued in Bresnahan and
Reiss (1991) and shown in more detail in
Schaumans and Verboven (2015), entry might
also increase product variety and thereby have a
positive effect on the consumers’ willingness to
pay. This countervailing effect of entry reduces
entry threshold ratios (since it decreases effective
competitive pressure). We would expect this ‘vari-
ety effect’ of entry to become stronger with the
increase in real income between 1995 and 2010.
This may explain why hardly any change in entry
threshold ratios is observed in the restaurant
industry.
Spatial spill-overs
The parameter ρ measures the influence of the spa-
tially weighted (unobserved) measure of neighbour-
hood profitability (Wy) on the (unobserved)
measure of profitability in the local market (y).
The theoretical impact of these spill-overs on the
number of firms in a local market is inherently
ambiguous. At least 3 different effects may be
relevant.
First, spill-over effects can be attributed to
demand linkages14 between neighbouring markets.
Firms not only benefit from an increase in local
population (local demand) but also gain from a
large population in neighbouring markets. Note
that 58% of the markets in our sample had no auto-
mobile dealer in 2001; for plumbers this number
goes up to 70% and for electricians it reaches 77%.
Inhabitants in these cities and villages will patronize
firms in other (neighbouring) cities; these neigh-
bouring markets will thus benefit from positive
demand spill-overs.
While demand spill-over effects are taken into
account (to some extent) in the existing empirical
literature by including measures of the population in
neighbouring regions, countervailing spill-over
effects due to competitive forces are typically ignored.
The above numbers suggest that not all goods are
produced locally but that some are imported from
neighbouring markets. Firms in a local market are
thus exposed to competitive pressure from firms in
neighbouring markets, which counteracts the afore-
mentioned demand spill-over effects (and implies a
negative parameter value for ρ).
Finally, a non-zero value for ρ could be the result of
unobserved differences in entry barriers across regions.
Note that the pace of transition has not been the same
in all parts of Slovakia and structural change and
economic development are unevenly balanced between
regions. While western regions of Slovakia are in closer
proximity to EU markets and have a much better net-
work of good roads and motorways, the poorer eastern
regions border similarly poor regions in neighbouring
countries suffer from significant transport infrastruc-
ture bottlenecks. Unobservable differences in the eco-
nomic environment of larger regions would imply a
positive spatial correlation in the error term for local
markets within these regions (and thus a positive para-
meter estimate for ρ).
Tables 4 and 5 report significant and positive
parameter estimates for ρ for all periods and occu-
pations. This suggests that spatial spill-over effects
are important and that the effect of demand linkages
and/or the positive correlation in unobservable
regional characteristics seems to outweigh the nega-
tive spill-over effects associated with competitive
forces between neighbouring regions.
The positive spill-over effects are likely to wane
with the decline of entry barriers, mainly because
consumers are given the opportunity to buy locally
and as such have a smaller incentive to make pur-
chases in neighbouring towns which should decrease
the demand spill-overs across town borders. This
decline is clearly visible in the estimates of the
spill-over parameter for plumbers and automobile
dealers.15
14In principle, it would be possible to isolate demand linkages by estimating an SDM model, where the spatially lagged population is one of the
explanatory variables. In practice, the strong correlation between population and the number of firms makes it difficult to separate Wy from W ln S.
The issue of collinearity is further aggravated by the fact that some control variables are available at district level only leading to a close connection
between X and WX .
15However, the interpretation of the positive effects observed on the market for automobile dealers should be cautious, as this category aggregates several
types of sellers and the positive correlation may be a result of this process.
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Surprisingly, the opposite trend can be observed
in the market of electricians as well as the restau-
rant market, where spill-over effects (parameter
estimates of ρ) remain similar in all periods and
even increase over the period from 1995 to 2010.
This result is intriguing in the case of electricians,
since this occupation experienced the largest
inflow of firms. One may view the increase in
the parameter ρ as indicative of the presence of
disproportionally large pay-offs in high-profit
neighbourhoods. The pay-offs of entering in a
neighbourhood with high profitability, even when
entry barriers are sufficiently low to increase expo-
sure to competition, may increase if sellers provide
services not only to households but also to corpo-
rate clients in related industries with agglomera-
tion effects. If this is the case, the presence of a
competitor in the neighbourhood may be offset by
the extra demand generated from the presence of
firms from other industries.16 With entry of new
firms in the automobile manufacturing and ICT
sector being spatially clustered and closely related
to the accession into the EU, one can see that for
electricians the importance of proximity to profit-
able neighbouring markets rose in 2010. While
this effect is unlikely to be significant for retail
automobile dealers and plumbers, it could very
well be the case that the demand for electricians
is higher in areas with large production capacities,
generating spatial clustering.
Spatial spill-overs also appear to be increasing in
the restaurant industry. The number of sellers in this
category did not increase significantly in our obser-
vation period, as new entry was generally offset by
exits of existing firms. As noted by Berry and
Waldfogel (2010), this industry has a number of
specifics not shared by other occupations.
While positive spatial spill-over effects were rela-
tively small in the first 2 observation periods, they
increased substantially in 2010. On the one hand,
this can be attributed to improvements in infrastruc-
ture and a reduction in costs of visiting more distant
restaurants. On the other hand, it is important to
note that the size of the relevant geographical market
might differ with respect to the quality of a restau-
rant. Berry and Waldfogel (2010) suggest that (l)
imited service restaurants have a neighbourhood as
their geographic market while the market area for
fancier restaurants is probably closer to the entire
metropolitan area (p.10). The observed increase in
income levels might have led to a higher willingness
to pay for variety and quality and could thus explain
why the relevant geographical market has expanded
for restaurants.
As a final illustration of the importance of spatial
spill-over effects, we estimate by how much the local
break-even population changes when the average
population in the neighbourhood increases. The
results for electricians are summarized in Figure 3.
The first thing to note is the decline in the monopoly
break-even population (S1). Assuming a perfectly
isolated local market, Table 10 suggests that 558
inhabitants are required for the first electrician to
break even in 2010. This number declines substan-
tially if the additional demand originating from the
population in neighbouring villages is taken into
account.
Figure 3 further suggests a negative relationship
between S1 and the size of the neighbouring village
(solid line): having a large number of consumers in the
neighbourhood implies that sellers do not need to rely
solely on local population. This effect is non-linear: as
the population in the neighbourhood increases, the
decline in the break-even population is particularly
strong for smaller villages.17 In the case of a neighbour-
ing town with a population equal to the median of the
population distribution, for example, the results shown
in Figure 3 suggest that the effect of 1 additional inhabi-
tant in the local market is equivalent to the effect of 16
additional inhabitants in the neighbourhood. As men-
tioned above, the marginal effect of a population
increase in the neighbourhood declines with the size of
the neighbouring village. This is plausible insofar as
firms will be able to attract a larger share of consumers
in smaller as opposed to larger villages due to more
intense competition in larger cities.18
It should also be noted that information on the
distance to all towns (within a reasonable boundary)
16Schaumans and Verboven (2008) study the strategic complementarity of entry into related industries (pharmacies and physicians) in more detail. In their
model, the marginal profits from entering in the pharmacy market increase when a physician decides to enter in the same regional market. They find
empirical evidence for 847 local markets (defined at the town level) in 2001 in Belgium that entry into one profession has a positive effect on the
profitability of entry into the other profession, suggesting that the entry decisions by firms of different professions are strategic complements.
17Note that this decrease in the marginal effect of consumers is inherent in the model (see Equations (4) and (5)) and not a result of the estimation results.
18Note that the number of rival firms is assumed constant in Figure 3 while the population in the neighbourhood increases.
16 M. LÁBAJ ET AL.
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is taken into account in this scenario, which can be
seen as an improvement to specifications which con-
trol for distance to only 1 competitor. Furthermore,
through standardization, we take into account that a
town in an isolated area is likely to have consumers
who are more willing to travel longer distances to
hire a professional.
Summarizing, we find strong empirical evidence for
the presence of spatial interactions in entry decisions.
Furthermore, the importance of spatial interactions
differs between the industries analysed and also chan-
ged over time: spatial spill-over effects (measured by the
parameter ρ) declined for plumbers and automobile
dealers but increased for electricians and restaurants.
Other service industries
Tables 11–15 report estimates for 4 additional indus-
tries (beauticians, fitness studios, driving schools and
taxi services), which differ significantly from the
industries we focus on in the main analysis. In
particular, these services are characterized by a
demand which is less likely to correlate with large
investment decisions and therefore is unlikely to be
influenced by the availability of credit. Additionally,
these industries are characterized by significantly
lower coverage than the one observed on the mar-
kets in our main analysis, which results in less pre-
cise estimates of the entry thresholds and the
corresponding ratios. However, these industries pro-
vide an insight into the lower limit of the effects of
liberalization, as they are unlikely to be affected by
macroeconomic changes other than fluctuations in
disposable income.
In terms of the monopoly entry threshold popula-
tion, the results from our main analysis hold true. We
find a significant decrease in the break-even population
of a monopolist on these markets. The distribution of
these sellers is relatively more sparse, which is reflected
in the extremely high estimated entry thresholds, which
point to the urban nature of these services (with beau-
tician services being the exception to this rule).
When it comes to competitive behaviour as mea-
sured by our estimates of the entry threshold ratios, the
results are not clear-cut. Beauticians and taxi services
seem to have experienced an increase in monopoly
margins over the transition period. This may be due
to a decrease in the elasticity of demand for these
services which offsets the additional competitive pres-
sure. The opposite holds true for fitness studios and
driving schools. However, since in these industries
atomistic markets are rarely observed, it is unclear
how well the threshold for 7 firms is estimated and
hence how reliable the reported estimates are.
In terms of spatial spill-overs, we also find a
significantly different picture to the one seen in our
main estimation. In particular, we find that beauti-
cians and fitness studios experience significant nega-
tive spill-overs in 1995. This suggests that consumers
were likely unwilling to travel to a neighbouring
town to take advantage of these services, meaning
that firms chose to locate in the largest available
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Figure 3. Simulation of the relationship between local break-even population and neighbouring population for electricians in 2010.
The vertical bars represent the distribution of villages and cities in Slovakia according to their average neighbouring population.
There are 138 cities with an average (spatially weighted) population above 4,000 individuals. These have been removed from the
graph in order to improve readability. The average population per village is 1,879.
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town in a certain area and that a positive profit-
ability in the neighbourhood was likely to attract
sellers away from the local market. The market for
taxi services shows a significant positive correlation
in outcomes, similarly to the industries in our main
specification, whereas in the case for driving schools
supply and demand effects appear to cancel out.
V. Summary and extensions
The present article provides first (indirect) empirical
evidence on the effects of entry on market conduct for
a transition economy. We use the framework pio-
neered by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and estimate
size thresholds required to support different numbers
of firms for several retail and professional service
Table 11. Number of firms in regional submarkets in 1995, 2001 and 2010.
Number of firms
Beauticians Fitness studios Driving schools Taxi services
1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010
Number of local markets
0 2193 1974 1374 2680 2598 2190 2695 2707 2606 2664 2580 2456
1 381 471 637 110 192 436 88 98 180 111 187 267
2 108 187 305 23 33 114 24 33 47 19 44 72
3 35 80 176 10 16 52 9 13 19 17 27 26
4 21 33 105 5 8 27 7 8 6 5 7 20
5 9 20 64 1 11 13 7 7 13 1 6 11
6 14 13 45 3 5 9 2 5 9 3 4 11
 7 82 119 220 11 34 85 11 26 46 23 42 63
Share of local markets with a particular number of firms in %
0 77.14 68.14 46.96 94.27 89.68 74.85 94.79 93.44 89.06 93.70 89.06 83.94
1 13.40 16.26 21.77 3.87 6.63 14.90 3.10 3.38 6.15 3.90 6.45 9.13
2 3.80 6.45 10.42 0.81 1.14 3.90 0.84 1.14 1.61 0.67 1.52 2.46
3 1.23 2.76 6.02 0.35 0.55 1.78 0.32 0.45 0.65 0.60 0.93 0.89
4 0.74 1.14 3.59 0.18 0.28 0.92 0.25 0.28 0.21 0.18 0.24 0.68
5 0.32 0.69 2.19 0.04 0.38 0.44 0.25 0.24 0.44 0.04 0.21 0.38
6 0.49 0.45 1.54 0.11 0.17 0.31 0.07 0.17 0.31 0.11 0.14 0.38
 7 2.88 4.11 7.52 0.39 1.17 2.90 0.39 0.90 1.57 0.81 1.45 2.15
There are 2843 observations for 1995; 2897 for 2001; and 2926 for 2010.
Table 12. Parameter estimates obtained from a spatial ordered probit model for Slovakia in 1995, 2001 and 2010 for beauticians
and fitness studios.
Beauticians Fitness studios
1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010
Population (log) (α) 1.3373*** 1.1627*** 1.1720*** 0.9202*** 0.8871*** 0.9863***
(0.0469) (0.0389) (0.0407) (0.0756) (0.0536) (0.0349)
Wages −0.0027 0.0021*** 0.0002 0.0047 0.0026** 0.0000
(0.0031) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0049) (0.0010) (0.0004)
Unemployment (%) 0.0003 0.0030*** −2.7020*** −0.0195 0.0011 −2.0661***
(0.0090) (0.0009) (0.4862) (0.0155) (0.0010) (0.5943)
Young (%) −8.3589*** −7.8422*** −5.4376*** −11.7769*** −9.6111*** −4.4304***
(1.2438) (0.9011) (0.6786) (2.3980) (1.5762) (0.8495)
Elderly (%) −5.7547*** −4.5979*** −2.0796*** −4.9557*** −3.2009** 0.5853
(1.0512) (0.8597) (0.6888) (1.9055) (1.3058) (0.8225)
θ1 6.3448*** 6.4924*** 5.8429*** 5.8202*** 5.9704*** 6.4365***
(0.9598) (0.5505) (0.4273) (1.6172) (0.8449) (0.4901)
θ2 7.4232*** 7.4226*** 6.8096*** 6.8011*** 6.9573*** 7.4045***
(0.9639) (0.5545) (0.4426) (1.6240) (0.8499) (0.4949)
θ3 8.0856*** 8.0976*** 7.4218*** 7.3783*** 7.4000*** 7.9162***
(0.9666) (0.5605) (0.4561) (1.6303) (0.8565) (0.4995)
θ4 8.4767*** 8.5867*** 7.9028*** 7.7787*** 7.7274*** 8.3005***
(0.9702) (0.5646) (0.4718) (1.6352) (0.8616) (0.5065)
θ5 8.8093*** 8.8825*** 8.2700*** 8.0880*** 7.9363*** 8.5891***
(0.9767) (0.5679) (0.4831) (1.6416) (0.8649) (0.5147)
θ6 8.9822*** 9.1127*** 8.5555*** 8.2133*** 8.2580*** 8.7739***
(0.9790) (0.5715) (0.4897) (1.6476) (0.8694) (0.5190)
θ7 9.2721*** 9.2902*** 8.8111*** 8.5058*** 8.4412*** 8.9269***
(0.9816) (0.5749) (0.4934) (1.6523) (0.8717) (0.5226)
ρ −0.1607*** −0.0331 0.1038*** −0.2124* 0.0255 0.0414
(0.0489) (0.0394) (0.0337) (0.1105) (0.0873) (0.0510)
Observations 2843 2897 2926 2843 2897 2926
All markets with more than 7 firms are pooled in 1 category. SEs are in parenthesis.
***,** and * indicate that parameters are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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industries. The firms’ entry and exit decisions reveal
information about the underlying (latent) profit func-
tion, the role of entry costs and the intensity of com-
petition. The 3 time periods analysed (1995, 2001 and
2010) characterize the different stages of the Slovak
transformation process. In 1995, the Slovak economy
was in the early phases of a turbulent transition pro-
cess with an unclear trajectory of its future route. Half
a decade later, in 2001, the economy was in the pro-
cess of relieving itself of post-socialist deformations
Table 13. Parameter estimates obtained from a spatial ordered probit model for Slovakia in 1995, 2001 and 2010 for driving schools
and taxi services.
Driving schools Taxi services
1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010
Population (log) (α) 0.8801*** 1.0651*** 0.9319*** 0.6846*** 0.7116*** 0.7759***
(0.0791) (0.0761) (0.0458) (0.0635) (0.0443) (0.0345)
Wages −0.0105** 0.0021 0.0003 0.0072* 0.0011 0.0004
(0.0052) (0.0014) (0.0005) (0.0038) (0.0009) (0.0004)
Unemployment (%) −0.0219 0.0017 0.0739 −0.0127 0.0026*** −0.7278
(0.0155) (0.0013) (0.7716) (0.0119) (0.0009) (0.5715)
Young (%) −4.0058* −3.9266** −4.3983*** −0.5994 −4.7794*** −1.3643
(2.1779) (1.9334) (1.2746) (1.6916) (1.2365) (0.8804)
Elderly (%) −3.5377* −0.5903 −0.9972 −2.0021 −4.4018*** 0.3941
(2.0801) (1.8675) (1.2962) (1.6242) (1.2449) (0.9281)
θ1 4.0417** 9.5730*** 7.0985*** 6.8802*** 4.2673*** 5.9403***
(1.6613) (1.1854) (0.6887) (1.3828) (0.7503) (0.5279)
θ2 4.8269** 10.3647*** 7.8680*** 7.6032*** 5.1023*** 6.7315***
(1.6672) (1.1894) (0.6939) (1.3856) (0.7539) (0.5348)
θ3 5.3568*** 10.9564*** 8.3207*** 7.8608*** 5.5205*** 7.1707***
(1.6761) (1.2011) (0.7002) (1.3882) (0.7588) (0.5407)
θ4 5.6882*** 11.3052*** 8.6136*** 8.2099*** 5.9146*** 7.4141***
(1.6807) (1.2132) (0.7077) (1.3944) (0.7644) (0.5434)
θ5 6.0127*** 11.5693*** 8.7380*** 8.3768*** 6.0710*** 7.6588***
(1.6829) (1.2203) (0.7108) (1.3964) (0.7688) (0.5463)
θ6 6.4263*** 11.8540*** 9.0063*** 8.4406*** 6.2371*** 7.8221***
(1.6868) (1.2252) (0.7185) (1.3973) (0.7723) (0.5490)
θ7 6.6222*** 12.0997*** 9.2226*** 8.5810*** 6.3735*** 8.0188***
(1.6884) (1.2313) (0.7241) (1.4020) (0.7761) (0.5543)
ρ −0.1140 −0.1799* −0.0122 0.2003* 0.3744*** 0.3702***
(0.1148) (0.1059) (0.0739) (0.1202) (0.0575) (0.0502)
Observations 2843 2897 2926 2843 2897 2926
All markets with more than 7 firms are pooled in 1 category. SEs are in parenthesis.
***,** and * indicate that parameters are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 14. Per-firm entry thresholds for Slovakia in 1995, 2001 and 2010.
Beauticians Fitness studios Driving schools Taxi services
1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010
Total threshold population
S1 1842 1229 581 13,795 5099 1700 12,797 8776 4536 7699 3234 2117
S2 4127 2736 1326 40,053 15,510 4536 31,231 18,456 10,358 22,137 10,455 5869
S3 6772 4889 2235 74,994 25,547 7620 57,029 32,165 16,835 32,249 18,817 10,337
S4 9072 7446 3369 115,877 36,953 11,251 83,098 44,630 23,053 53,698 32,739 14,146
S5 11,635 9603 4609 162,179 46,760 15,076 120,152 57,188 26,344 68,530 40,787 19,389
S6 13,241 11,705 5880 185,822 67,203 18,183 192,217 74,711 35,134 75,224 51,513 23,931
S7 16,446 13,635 7313 255,347 82,617 21,235 240,136 94,098 44,312 92,345 62,399 30,837
Threshold population per firm
s1 1842 1229 581 13,795 5099 1700 12,797 8776 4536 7699 3234 2117
(84) (42) (19) (3794) (796) (83) (3897) (1828) (560) (2570) (459) (176)
s2 2063 1368 663 20,027 7755 2268 15,615 9228 5179 11,069 5228 2934
(64) (33) (11) (3478) (804) (79) (2904) (1170) (400) (2267) (529) (171)
s3 2257 1630 745 24,998 8516 2540 19,010 10,722 5612 10,750 6272 3446
(59) (34) (10) (3256) (668) (70) (2,649) (1022) (324) (1,561) (490) (156)
s4 2268 1861 842 28,969 9238 2813 20,775 11,157 5763 13,425 8185 3536
(49) (35) (12) (3088) (589) (66) (2312) (852) (264) (1597) (547) (131)
s5 2327 1921 922 32,436 9352 3015 24,030 11,438 5269 13,706 8157 3878
(44) (32) (12) (2942) (499) (63) (2275) (729) (198) (1363) (455) (124)
s6 2207 1951 980 30,970 11,200 3030 32,036 12,452 5856 12,537 8586 3988
(37) (29) (12) (2384) (531) (56) (2764) (695) (194) (1056) (418) (110)
s7 2349 1948 1045 36,478 11,802 3034 34,305 13,443 6330 13,192 8914 4405
(35) (26) (11) (2537) (495) (49) (2622) (664) (189) (975) (386) (110)
SEs are in parenthesis.
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and preparing for European integration. After being a
member of the European Union for 6 years, the rele-
vant institutions as well as the functioning of the
Slovak economy in 2010 have already converged sig-
nificantly towards Western European standards.
Consistent with these observations, our results
indicate that the effect of entry on market conduct
has changed over time. While entry threshold ratios
tend to be larger than 1 and decline with the number
of firms in most professions in 1995, the estimation
results obtained for 2010 suggest entry threshold
ratios much closer to 1. This finding is indicative
of a significant decline in entry barriers, which cor-
responds with evidence from business surveys.19
The second novel contribution of the present article
concerns the explicit analysis of spatial spill-over effects
in the entry-threshold approach. These effects should
be particularly important in densely populated markets
(such as those of Central European countries or large
urban areas in general). Parameter estimates from
spatial ordered probit models suggest that demand
spill-overs and/or the effects associated with a positive
correlation in unobservable explanatory variables
outweigh negative spill-over effects caused by compe-
titive forces between neighbouring cities and villages.
While these spatial effects are found to decline over the
transition period for automobile dealers and plumbers,
we observe an increase in the estimated spill-over
parameters for electricians and restaurants.
Unfortunately, identification and isolation of the
individual (countervailing) spatial effects (demand
spill-overs, competitive effects as well as effects asso-
ciated with spatially correlated residuals) is not possi-
ble in the empirical model used in the present article
but is deferred to future research. Future work should
also investigate the importance of sunk costs and entry
barriers for a firm’s conduct in more detail by supple-
menting the present approach with an analysis of
prices and costs (Einav and Levin 2010). Further, the
impact of infrastructure quality and human capital
could be explicitly considered in empirical models
on entry, exit and competition. And finally, following
the approach suggested in Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry
(2007) or Abbring and Campbell (2010) would allow
researchers to extend the static Bresnahan and Reiss
framework to a dynamic setting. Explicitly modelling
Table 15. Entry threshold ratios for Slovakia in 1995, 2001 and 2010.
Beauticians Fitness studios Driving schools Taxi services
1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010
Per-firm entry threshold ratios (s7=sN)
s7=s1 1.28 1.58 1.80 2.64 2.31 1.78 2.68 1.53 1.40 1.71 2.76 2.08
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.75) (0.37) (0.09) (0.84) (0.33) (0.18) (0.59) (0.41) (0.18)
s7=s2 1.14 1.42 1.58 1.82 1.52 1.34 2.20 1.46 1.22 1.19 1.71 1.50
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.34) (0.17) (0.05) (0.44) (0.20) (0.10) (0.26) (0.19) (0.10)
s7=s3 1.04 1.20 1.40 1.46 1.39 1.19 1.80 1.25 1.13 1.23 1.42 1.28
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.22) (0.12) (0.04) (0.29) (0.13) (0.07) (0.20) (0.13) (0.07)
s7=s4 1.04 1.05 1.24 1.26 1.28 1.08 1.65 1.20 1.10 0.98 1.09 1.25
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.16) (0.10) (0.03) (0.22) (0.11) (0.06) (0.14) (0.09) (0.06)
s7=s5 1.01 1.01 1.13 1.12 1.26 1.01 1.43 1.18 1.20 0.96 1.09 1.14
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.13) (0.09) (0.03) (0.17) (0.09) (0.06) (0.12) (0.08) (0.05)
s7=s6 1.06 1.00 1.07 1.18 1.05 1.00 1.07 1.08 1.08 1.05 1.04 1.10
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.12) (0.07) (0.02) (0.12) (0.08) (0.05) (0.12) (0.07) (0.04)
Test ratio = 1
s7=s1=1 *** *** *** ** *** *** ** ** *** ***
Chi-sq. 19.99 100.72 166.31 4.8 12.33 72.87 3.99 2.63 4.99 1.48 18.47 35.93
s7=s2=1 *** *** *** ** *** *** *** ** ** *** ***
Chi-sq. 12.45 117.17 356.92 5.81 9.41 42.79 7.34 5.31 4.82 0.55 14.13 27.76
s7=s3=1 *** *** ** *** *** *** * * *** ***
Chi-sq. 1.71 42.92 274.32 4.54 9.8 25.88 7.87 3.56 3.06 1.29 11 17.78
s7=s4=1 * *** *** ** *** * ***
Chi-sq. 1.73 3.63 124.41 2.62 8.1 6.46 8.54 3.5 2.68 0.02 1.06 19.5
s7=s5=1 *** *** ** * *** ***
Chi-sq. 0.15 0.43 49.34 0.94 9.36 0.05 6.06 3.42 12.23 0.1 1.45 8.73
s7=s6=1 *** *** * **
Chi-sq. 7.32 0.01 15.18 2.12 0.65 0 0.33 0.98 2.83 0.2 0.32 6.43
***,** and * indicate that the ETRs are significantly different from one at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
19In the 1990s, Slovakia was the country with the largest number of days required to start a business among the 18 countries listed in Table 3 in Estrin
(2002). However, the country halved the time to register a business a few years later and, according to the World Bank Doing Business survey, was ranked
among top reformers in the business environment in 2005.
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the dynamics of entry and exit is particularly impor-
tant in order to further improve our understanding of
the relationship between market structure and com-
petition in a transition economy.
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